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Back to a Sovereign Future?:  Constitutional Pluralism After 
Brexit 
Cormac Mac Amhlaigh (University of Edinburgh) 
Word count 7714 (10, 273 inc. footnotes) 
 
Abstract 
To the extent to which the UK’s decision to withdraw from the EU can be interpreted as a 
reassertion of the classic ideas of Westphalian sovereign statehood, it questions the relevance 
of constitutional pluralism as a resolutely ‘post-sovereign’ model of relations between state 
administrations and their supranational counterparts.  This contribution will therefore examine 
the usefulness and relevance of the idea of constitutional pluralism after Brexit.    It looks at 
the various features and relationships affected by the Brexit process analysing the relevance of 
constitutional pluralism to each relationship pre- and post- Brexit, concluding that, whereas 
Brexit clearly affects the different relationships involved, constitutional pluralism can and will 
remain relevant to EU/UK relations as well as within the EU, well into the future.   
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I. BREXIT AS CONSTITUTIONAL EVENT 
 
As a constitutional event, Brexit is unprecedented in both the EU and UK’s constitutional 
arrangements.    From the UK’s perspective, few events have had such a profound impact on 
the UK’s legal infrastructure as the UK’s accession to the EU’s sophisticated legal order and 
the gradual implementation of the latter into the former over the decades by the UK courts. 
From the EU’s perspective, no Member State – let alone an economically and militarily 
powerful one – has ever left the bloc thus posing potentially existential questions about the 
future security and viability of the integration project.   
In this paper, one discrete aspect of the Brexit event touching on some of these questions 
will be analysed: namely the extent to which it challenges constitutional pluralism as both an 
analytical and normative account of the interactions between the EU and UK’s legal and 
political orders.1    Initiated in the work of Neil MacCormick,2 constitutional pluralism involves 
the idea that two autonomous legal and political systems can interact at a high degree of 
intensity, making simultaneous claims to ultimate authority, without one being subordinated to 
the other (descriptive constitutional pluralism);3   as well as the idea that conflicts between two  
systems interacting in this way should be resolved according to prudential judicial politics,4  or 
principles, shared by,5  or external to,6 both systems (normative constitutional pluralism).7  Key 
to the idea of constitutional pluralism in both its forms is that the systems are organised in a 
                                               
1 See the introduction to the symposium. 
2  Neil MacCormick’s writings on constitutional pluralism are primarily contained in Neil MacCormick, 
‘Beyond the Sovereign State’ (1993) 56 The Modern Law Review 1; Neil MacCormick, ‘The Maastricht-Urteil: 
Sovereignty Now’ (1995) 1 European Law Journal 259; N MacCormick, ‘Risking Constitutional Collision in 
Europe?’ (1998) 18 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 517; N MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty (Oxford 
University Press 1999).   
3 Neil Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2002) 65 The Modern Law Review 317, 337. 
4 What MacCormick called ‘radical pluralism’. MacCormick, ‘Questioning Sovereignty’ above note 2, 117. 
5 For example, Kumm and Maduro suggest that potential conflicts between EU law and state law can be 
resolved according to principles shared between the two orders; M Kumm, ‘The Jurisprudence of Constitutional 
Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe before and after the Constitutional Treaty’ (2005) 11 European 
Law Journal 262; M. Poiares Maduro, ‘Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action’ in 
Walker, Neil (ed), Sovereignty in transition (Hart 2003). 
6 Such as the norms of public international law in MacCormick’s ‘pluralism under international law’;  
MacCormick, ‘Questioning Sovereignty’ above note 2, 117. 
7 Walker, above note 3, 337. 
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heterarchial rather than a hierarchical arrangement.8  As such, a key premiss of constitutional 
pluralism is that the hierarchal concept of sovereignty is either no longer relevant to such 
relationships,9  or is in transition from the ‘high sovereignty’10  of the Westphalian world view 
of independent sovereign states to a model of ‘late sovereignty’.11     
To the extent to which the vote for Brexit was about ‘taking back control’, it seems to 
suggest  a ‘rewind’12  to a classically Westphalian worldview, where states are the exclusive 
authorities over their territories, and alien norms, including those of supranational entities such 
as the EU, are valid only through the recognition of, and to the extent permitted by, the state 
legal order in the exercise of their (Westphalian) sovereign powers.  From a legal perspective, 
then, Brexit seems to suggest a move from a ‘post-sovereign’ novel arrangement predicted on 
constitutional pluralism to a classic dualist or Westphalian understanding of the relationship 
between the UK and the EU.  Moreover, the potential impact of Brexit on the European 
integration project has prompted calls for an end to the ambiguities of ‘post-sovereign’ models 
of organisation such as constitutional pluralism and a shift to a more unambiguous 
understanding of the relationship between the EU and its Member States by forging a clearer 
path to (hierarchical) EU federalism.13  In these ways, Brexit seems to question constitutional 
                                               
8 ibid. 
9 MacCormick, ‘Questioning Sovereignty’ above note 2, Ch. 8. 
10 Mac Amhlaigh, C, ‘Late Sovereignty in Post-Integration Europe:  Continuity and Change in a Constitutive 
Concept’ in Rebecca Adler-Nissen and Ulrika Pram Gad (eds), European integration and postcolonial 
sovereignty games: the EU overseas countries and territories (Routledge 2013), 41. 
11 Walker, Neil, ‘Late Sovereignty in the European Union’ in Walker, Neil (ed), Sovereignty in Transition (Hart 
Publishing 2003). 
12 Walker, above note 3, 338. 
13 For an argument along these lines see the contribution to the current symposium by Pech and Kelemen.  In the 
political sphere, Commission President Junker’s 2018 State of the Union speech to the European Parliament 
called for a ‘European sovereignty’.  See ‘The Hour of European Sovereignty’, 2018 State of the Union Speech 
available at:  https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-speech_en_0.pdf  Also the 
European Parliament’s chief Brexit interlocuter Guy Verhofstadt and French President Emmanuel Macron have 
come out vocally in favour of major EU institutional reform after Brexit:   ‘Guy Verhofstadt:  Brexit is a golden 
opportunity for the EU’ Politico Europe 30 January 2017 available at:  https://www.politico.eu/article/guy-
verhofstadt-brexit-is-a-golden-opportunity-for-the-eu/;  ‘Macron lays out vision for ‘profound’ change in post-
Brexit EU’ The Guardian  26 September 2017:  https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/26/profound-
transformation-macron-lays-out-vision-for-post-brexit-eu.  Also, serious discussion on an EU army suggest a 
similar trajectory: ‘Merkel Joins Macron in Calling for a European Army ‘One Day’ New York Times, 13 
November 2018:  https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/13/world/europe/merkel-macron-european-army.html 
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pluralism as a way of explaining the interactions between EU law and UK law and as a guiding 
political principle of European integration.  This paper challenges both of these views, arguing 
that constitutional pluralism will (and should) remain relevant to the EU/UK law relationship 
and the future of integration long after Brexit. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Part two gives a brief account of how EU law has 
sedimented into the UK constitution in the years since the UK joined the organisation in 1973.  
In the absence of explicit statutory recognition of the primacy doctrine in the European 
Communities Act 1972, it provides an overview of the necessarily judicial negotiation of the 
balance between primacy and parliamentary sovereignty.  Part three makes the case that this 
judicial negotiation of the status and effect of EU law is best captured by constitutional 
pluralism as a model of interacting legal orders, when compared to alternatives such as monism 
and dualism.  Part four goes on to consider reforms in this relationship post-Brexit through an 
analysis of the key provisions of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, concluding that 
we can expect a relationship of constitutional pluralism to continue well into the future after 
the UK exits the EU based on the provisions of this Act.  Part 5 turns to the EU level to consider 
the role that constitutional pluralism can play in future constitutional reform in the EU as a 
response to its multiple crises.  Emphasising changes in the post-Brexit political landscape 
among the remaining EU 27, particularly in terms of enhanced support for the EU and the 
solidarity between the EU 27 during the Brexit process, it concludes that constitutional 
pluralism should continue to be a guiding principle of EU constitutional reform into the future. 
 
II. A NEGOTIATED UNSETTLEMENT:  EU LAW IN THE UK CONSTITUTION 
 
In order to assess the relevance of constitutional pluralism post-Brexit, it is necessary to revisit 
the story of the assimilation of EU law into the UK constitution prior to the UK’s eventual 
withdrawal.  As is well known, the European Communities Act 1972 (‘ECA’) created the 
structural links between the UK constitution and the EU’s legal order, and between the UK 
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courts and EU courts.  In particular, it gives expression to the unique features of the EU legal 
order; the fact that it is a ‘constitutional’ system which makes independent claims to validity 
and authority as expressed in the doctrines of direct effect and primacy.14  Significantly, 
however, only one of these core features is expressly provided for in the Act itself.  Section 
2(1) of the Act, in providing that  ‘[a]ll such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and 
restrictions’ arising under the EU Treaties are ‘without further enactment’ to be given legal 
effect and ‘recognised and available in law’, clearly introduces the direct effect of EU law into 
the UK’s legal system.15  That the primacy doctrine existed when the UK joined,16 and was 
unambiguously incorporated in the UK’s legal order, is clear from its status as an ‘obligation 
and restriction’ created ‘by or under the Treaties’ under section 2 ECA.  Moreover, as a 
judicially-developed doctrine embedded in the case law of the EU courts, UK courts are bound 
to apply it under section 3 ECA.17   However, explicit mention of the doctrine itself is notably 
absent from the Act; an omission made all the more glaring in the light of the fact that its 
partner doctrine – that of direct effect – is given explicit recognition.  As a consequence, the 
ECA is completely silent as to how conflicts between EU law and the UK legal order should 
be managed.18    In the absence of any statutory guidance as to how, precisely, the doctrine of 
                                               
14 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Berlastingen C 26/62, EU:C:1962:42; Costa v ENEL C 
6/64, EU:C:1964:34.  The terms ‘supremacy’ and ‘primacy’ are used interchangeably in English.  UK courts 
have, in the main, called it the ‘supremacy’ of EU law and this is the version which appears in the Withdrawal 
Agreement 2018 (see further below).  However, as de Witte notes, the EU Courts have never actually used the 
term ‘supremacy’ and the only formal treaty-based recognition of the doctrine in Declaration 17 to the Lisbon 
Treaty uses the term ‘primacy’ which will therefore be used here. See generally B de Witte, ‘Direct Effect, 
Primacy, and the Nature of the Legal Order’ in P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds), Evolution of EU Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2011).  For a retelling and reappraisal of the well-known story see C. Mac Amhlaigh, ‘The 
European Union’s Constitutional Mosaic:  Big ‘C’ or small ‘c’; is that the question?’ in N. Walker, J. Shaw and 
S. Tierney, Europe’s Constitutional Mosaic (Hart Publishing, 2011). 
15 See, for example, the UK Supreme Court in R(Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union 
[2017] UKSC 5, para. 63.  
16 As was made clear by Lord Bridge in R v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex p. Factortame (No. 2) [1991] 1 
AC 603.  (see further below). 
17 A position that was made clear in the Factortame judgment where Lord Bridge noted that ‘[u]nder the terms 
of the Act of 1972 it has always been clear that it was the duty of a United Kingdom court, when delivering final 
judgement, to override any rule of national law found to be in conflict with any directly enforceable rule of 
Community law’,  ibid at 659.   
18 From the perspective of the UK constitution.  The ECJ had, of course, developed its own view of the 
relationship between primacy and domestic constitutional law in its case law.  See Costa above, note 14; Nimz v. 
City of Hamburg C-184/89 EU:C:199150.   For discussion see de Witte, above n 14,  340 – 346.  
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the primacy of EU law was to be given expression within the UK’s legal order, and in particular 
how it was to be reconciled with the foundational UK constitutional principle of parliamentary 
sovereignty, the negotiation of the relationship and the reconciliation of these two doctrines 
was left to the courts.   
 The first significant recognition and application of the principle of primacy in the UK 
constitution was in the celebrated Factortame decision.19  However, notwithstanding its status 
as a major milestone in the accommodation of EU law into the UK constitutional order; the 
case, somewhat surprisingly, has little to say about the relationship between primacy and 
parliamentary sovereignty.   Whereas the case confirmed that where an Act of Parliament and 
EU law conflicted, the Act should be set aside, it did little to clarify the relationship.20   It does 
not stipulate the terms and conditions under which displacement should take place, whether 
there are limits to this statutory displacement, and, more generally, how EU law rearranges the 
UK’s constitutional settlement based on the sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament.   
 The Thoburn case provided a little more clarification on this relationship by 
distinguishing between ‘constitutional statutes’ and ordinary statutes in the UK constitutional 
system.21 As a constitutional statute the Court found that the ECA is immune from implied 
repeal.22   However, at the same time as finding that the ECA, and therefore EU law, had an 
authoritative status in the constitution in this way, the court made clear that this authority did 
not displace or eradicate the constitutional authority of parliamentary sovereignty23 and that 
                                               
19 Above note 16. 
20 See, M Elliot, ‘Sovereignty, Primacy and the Common Law Constitution:  What has EU Membership Taught 
Us?’ in M Elliot, J Williams and A Young (eds) The UK Constitution After Miller:  Brexit and Beyond (Hart, 
2018) ; M Gordon, ‘Brexit:  A challenge for the UK constitution, of the UK constitution?’ (2016) European 
Constitutional Law Review 409-444. 
21 Thoburn v. Sunderland County Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin), [2003] QB 151.  For discussion, see A. 
Young, Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Human Rights Act (Oxford, Hart Publishing), Ch. 2; F. Ahmed and 
A. Perry, ‘The quasi-entrenchment of constitutional statutes’ (2014) 73 CLJ 514. 
22 As illustrated in Ellen St. Estates Ltd. V. Minister of Health [1934] 1 KB 590. 
23 Thoburn, above note 21, paras. 68-9. 
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where parliament wished to override a provision of EU law it could do so in express statutory 
terms.24    
The HS2 decision provided further nuance to the relationship between the primacy 
doctrine and parliamentary sovereignty in the absence of any explicit direction by the ECA 
itself.25  The UK Supreme Court found that where EU law required that one of the key 
manifestations of the doctrine of parliament sovereignty – the embargo on judicial scrutiny of 
legislative procedure26 – be suspended, it would not be able to undertake such an investigation 
and that the doctrine of the primacy of EU law may have to give way to the doctrine of the 
supremacy of the UK legislature.27   
 Whereas a balance between the doctrine of primacy and parliamentary sovereignty was 
not directly at issue in the Miller case,28 further clarification of the relationship was provided 
due to the fact that the Supreme Court, in order to answer the question involving the exercise 
of prerogative powers to trigger Article 50, was forced to consider the domestic constitutional 
status of EU law and the ECA.   In answering this question, the Court found that the effect of 
EU law on the constitution was ‘unprecedented’,29 such that the ECA made EU law not only a 
source of law in the UK but a ‘direct source of law’30 which ‘takes precedence over all other 
sources of law, including statutes.’31  Furthermore, and somewhat surprisingly, the Supreme 
Court found that whereas the ECA gave effect to EU law, ‘it was not itself the originating 
                                               
24 Thoburn, above note 21, para. 45 endorsing Lord Denning’s dictum in Marcarthys Ltd. v. Smith [1979] 3 
AER 325 where he found that “If the time should come when our Parliament deliberately passes and Act with 
the intention of repudiating the Treaty or any provision in it or intention of acting inconsistently with it and says 
so in express terms then I should have thought that it would be the duty of the courts to follow the statute of our 
Parliament.’ Per Lord Denning, 329c-d.  
25 R (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd.) v. Secretary of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3. 
26 Contained in the enrolled bill rule.  See Edinburgh and Dalkeith Railway Co v. Wauchope (1842) 8 C1 & F 
710. 
27 HS2 above note 25, para. 207. 
28 above note 15. 
29 ibid, para. 60. 
30 ibid, para. 61. 
31 ibid, para. 60. 
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source of that law’;32 EU law constituted an ‘independent and overriding source of domestic 
law.’33  However, all of the exceptionalism surrounding the ECA as a constitutional statute and 
EU law as an ‘independent and overriding source of domestic law’, was ultimately subject to 
the power of the UK Parliament to withdraw the UK from the EU and repeal the ECA.  Thus, 
notwithstanding its exceptional nature, the role of EU law in the UK constitution was still, 
ultimately, subject to the ‘rule of recognition’ which identifies Parliament as the ultimate 
source of law under the constitution.34 Parliament could repeal the ECA and EU law would 
cease to be a source of law under the constitution.  As such, EU law could only enjoy a status 
‘in domestic law which the principle [of parliamentary sovereignty] allows.’35 
 In the absence of statutory guidance on the role and relevance of the primacy of EU law 
in the ECA, the judicial negotiation of the tensions between the primacy doctrine and the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty can be characterised in the following terms, then.  The 
primacy doctrine is clearly available and applicable in the UK constitution.  EU law therefore 
is an important source of law in the UK constitution in that it owes its existence to law-making 
processes outwith the constitution and it enjoys an independent and original authority.36  
However, notwithstanding the original authority of EU law, its recognition within the UK 
constitutional system is not without conditions.  First of all, the recognition of primacy occurs 
by virtue of the UK constitutional system itself.  As such, the primacy of EU law is ultimately 
subject to the maintenance in force of the ECA.  EU law cannot prevent Parliament repealing 
the ECA should it so wish.  Moreover, even if Parliament does not exercise its ultimate 
sovereignty to repeal the ECA, there are still limits to the extent to which courts will apply the 
primacy doctrine.  Where important constitutional foundations are at stake, the UK courts may 
                                               
32 ibid, para. 65. 
33 ibid. 
34 ibid, para. 60. 
35 ibid, para. 67. 
36 ibid, para. 65. 
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subject the primacy doctrine to those constitutional principles including parliamentary 
sovereignty.  
 
III. REPRESENTING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EU LAW AND THE UK 
CONSTITUTION 
 
Reviewing the key features of the case law of UK courts on the accommodation of EU law 
reveals an ambiguity as to the specific status of EU law in the UK constitution and the precise 
balance between the primacy doctrine and the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.  There is 
no clear and simple ‘showdown’ where it can be definitively concluded that the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty remains completely intact, nor the primacy doctrine given 
unconditional precedence.  Whereas outer limits have been alluded to, such as in HS2, they 
have never been thoroughly explored nor precisely defined.    The identification of the ECA as 
a ‘constitutional statute’ precludes simple readings of parliamentary sovereignty as being 
equated with the continuing sovereignty of all parliaments at least as far as the doctrine of 
implied repeal is concerned.37  Furthermore, the ambiguity surrounding the nature and impact 
of EU law on parliamentary sovereignty is clearly in evidence in the Supreme Courts’ 
ambiguous comments in the Miller decision whereby it was simultaneously an ‘independent 
and overriding’ source of law under the UK constitution, yet also derivative and dependent on 
the ECA.38  This nuanced and negotiated ‘unsettlement’39 of the status of EU law in the UK 
illustrates quite clearly, it is argued, the relevance of the analytical model of constitutional 
pluralism to the UK/EU relationship.  This can be appreciated by comparing constitutional 
                                               
37 As primarily expressed in the idea that no parliament can bind its successors.  On continuing v. self-
embracing sovereignty see Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford 1961), Ch. 6. 
38 For discussion, see M Elliot, ‘The Supreme Court’s Judgment in Miller:  In Search of Constitutional 
Principle’ (2017) 76 Cambridge Law Journal 257.  
39 N. Walker ‘Our Constitutional Unsettlement’ (2014) 3 Public Law 529. 
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pluralism with the alternative extant models accounting for the relationship:  monism and 
dualism.40  Each one will be considered in turn. 
 Monism is, perhaps, the least plausible model.  On a monist reading, the relationship 
between EU law and UK constitutional law would be ordered hierarchically such that UK law 
would always be subject to EU law in cases of conflict and that UK law owed its validity, not 
to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, but to the EU’s legal order.41  This reading of the 
relationship between EU law and UK law has some affinity with the original 
‘constitutionalising’ judgments of the European Court of Justice and could support the direct 
effect and primacy of EU law.42  However, whereas the Court of Justice claimed that the 
‘special and original’ nature of EU law necessitated the doctrines of direct effect and primacy, 
it never claimed that national law owed its validity to EU law.  Moreover, as has already been 
seen from the statements of the UK courts, there is no evidence that this is how the relationship 
between the two operate within the UK constitution.43  The one clear and consistent theme 
from the key cases on the question is that UK courts deem EU law to be valid and effective in 
UK law by virtue of an Act of Parliament and not by virtue of the ‘special and original’ nature 
of EU law itself.44  Furthermore, as this relationship has developed, the courts have not 
                                               
40 For a more in-depth exploration of this issue, see J. Dickson, ‘How Many Legal Systems? Some Puzzles 
Regarding the Identity Conditions of, and Relations between, Legal Systems in the European Union’ (2008) 2 
Problema 9, 4. 
41 For an illustration of this possibility and other permutations and combinations of the relationship see  C. 
Richmond ‘Preserving the Identity Crisis:  Autonomy, System and Sovereignty in European Law’ (1997) 16 
Law and Philosophy 377. There is an alternative model of monism which Kelsen included in his account.  That 
is that the relationship between international law and state law can also be viewed from the perspective of state 
law.  The vantage point from which the single monist legal system is viewed is, therefore, a matter of 
perspective dictated by political or ideological considerations rather than a matter of legal logic.  H. Kelsen, 
General Theory of Law and State (Harvard University Press, 1945), 388.  For discussion see L. Vinx, Hans 
Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law:  Legality and Legitimacy (Oxford University Press, 2007), Chapter 6. 
42 Dickson, above note 40, 4.  
43 Perhaps the closest the UK Courts have come to adopting this position is Lord Denning’s notorious comments 
in Bulmer v. Bollinger, but even here the dominant influence of EU law is still predicated on the will of 
Parliament :  ‘when we come to matters with a European element [EU law] is like an incoming tide.  It flows 
into the estuaries and up the rivers.  It cannot be held back, Parliament has decreed that the Treaty is 
henceforward to be part of our law.  It is equal in force to any statute.’ HP Bulmer Ltd v. J Bollinger SA [1974] 
Ch 401, 418. 
44 As confirmed in statute in the EU Act 20,11 s. 18.   
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accepted the Court of Justice’s understanding of the primacy doctrine that in all cases that 
domestic law – including core tenets of the domestic constitution such as those at stake in HS2 
– will be compromised in the application of EU law.  This rules out any simple monist reading 
of the relationship between EU law and the UK constitution. 
 What of a dualist reading of the relationship?  Dualism involves the positing of two 
legal orders operating and interacting in particular ways, where one, or possibly both make 
claims to primacy or hierarchy in cases of conflicts between them.45  From the viewpoint of 
domestic courts, this has usually involved interactions between state law and international law, 
and dualism as a doctrine of domestic constitutional law usually posits the supremacy of the 
domestic constitution over conflicting provisions of international law.46   In the context of EU-
UK relations, then, dualism would find the British courts accepting that EU law was a distinct 
legal order which was autonomous from the UK constitution.  However, its distinctiveness 
exists only by virtue of the UK constitution and its statutory recognition in the ECA.  Moreover, 
in cases of conflicts between the EU and UK constitutional orders, the latter would prevail in 
all circumstances. 
 In some ways, dualism seems to provide a good account of the accommodation of EU 
law in the UK constitution outlined above.  For example, the idea endorsed by the UK courts 
in the cases considered above that EU law is valid and has effects in UK law by virtue of the 
UK constitutional order itself and in particular the ECA, entails classically dualist overtones.  
However, beyond this, it is not clear that dualism offers a good account of the relationship.  
With regard to the authority of EU law, dualism would insist that its authority in the UK system 
is wholly attributable to that particular system. However, in Miller the Supreme Court 
                                               
45 See, P.-M. Dupuy, ‘International Law and Domestic (Municipal) Law’ in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, April 2011. 
46 Ibid.  To this extent, dualism has an affinity with ‘reverse monism’ whereby state law is hierarchical to 
international law when the unitary legal system is viewed from the perspective of state law.  See Kelsen, above 
note 41. 
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recognised that EU law was an original ‘independent and overriding’47 source of law within 
the UK constitution, something which dualism cannot account for.  Moreover, with regard to 
the question of conflicts, dualism would insist that any conflicts always be resolved in favour 
of conventional UK constitutional law, and in particular the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty as conventionally understood including the doctrine of implied repeal.  However, 
as the cases considered above show, the position between conflicts between EU law and UK 
constitutional are more complex than the dualist position allows. The Factortame decision is a 
testament to the fact that conflicts will frequently, and arguably predominantly be resolved in 
favour of EU law.  Thus, while arguably an improvement on monism, it is submitted that 
dualism offers an unsatisfactory model to understand the relationship.   
The deficiencies of dualism can be rectified by constitutional pluralism as an account 
of the interactions between EU and UK law.  Like dualism, it posits two constitutional orders 
of equal standing, each making their own independent claims to constitutional authority, 
operating side-by-side and interacting in certain ways through a structural framework such as 
the ECA ‘portal’ in the UK.48  Moreover, unlike monism or dualism, constitutional pluralism 
explicitly rejects any all-purpose resolution of one system over the other; rather the two orders 
are mutually accommodating without directly challenging the authority of the other.49  
 In analysing the extent to which constitutional pluralism provides a good account of 
this relationship a number of features can be emphasised.  Firstly, the recognition of plural 
claims to constitutional authority.  In the cases discussed above, the original constitutional 
authority of EU law was clearly recognised in a way which had practical consequences for the 
application of UK constitutional law.  Furthermore, while these claims were recognised, the 
constitutional claims of the UK constitution were also recognised.  Perhaps nowhere is this 
                                               
47 Miller above n 15 , para. 65. 
48 N Walker, ‘Constitutional Pluralism Revisited’ (2016) 22(3) European Law Journal 333. 
49 MacCormick ‘Questioning Sovereignty’, above note 2, 117 
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clearer than in the Miller case where the Supreme Court simultaneously upheld the original 
and independent nature of EU law as a source of UK constitutional law as well as the 
constitutional authority of the UK Parliament.  Moreover, the definitive resolution of the 
question of ultimate authority in favour of one particular legal order is explicitly rejected by 
constitutional pluralism and is not, as noted above, a good account of the more nuanced 
accommodation of EU law within the UK constitution in the cases considered above.   If 
Factortame appeared to provide an all-purpose resolution of EU law over the UK constitution 
in that EU law seemed to have subordinated the sovereignty of Parliament through the 
disapplication of an Act,50 then Thoburn and particularly HS2, provide a counter-weight based 
on the constitutional authority of the UK constitution.  Indeed, in explicitly stating that there 
were limits to the extent of the application of EU law in the constitution as set by key 
fundamental principles, and offering insights into what those principles might be, the Supreme 
Court’s HS2 decision seems to come directly from the playbook of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court (GFCC) which was one of the primary instigators of pluralist thinking 
between EU law and Member State constitutional law.51    Perhaps most clearly, however, the 
ambiguity in the UK Supreme Court’s reasoning in the Miller decision,  where it 
simultaneously recognised EU law as an ‘independent and overriding’ source of law in the UK, 
as well as the recognition that its validity and effects were contingent upon their endorsement 
by the UK constitution in the form of a statute,52 precisely reflects the ambiguity of co-equal 
constitutional authority claims and mutual accommodation captured by constitutional 
pluralism.   
                                               
50 As argued, for example, by William Wade.  See W. Wade ‘Sovereignty – revolution or evolution?’ (1996) 
112(4) Law Quarterly Review 568.   
51 MacCormick, ‘The Maastricht Urteil’ above note 2.  For discussion in the context of HS2, see A Young, 
‘Wilkommen zum Constitutional Pluralism’ UK Constitutional Law Blog (17th February 2014)  (available 
at  https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/). 
52 For discussion, see Elliot, above note 38. 
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   This reading of the approach of the UK courts to EU law shows how the idea of 
constitutional pluralism provides, it is submitted, a better account of the accommodation of EU 
law within the UK’s constitutional order than the alternatives of monism or dualism.   
 
IV. THE NEGOTIATED UNSETTLEMENT AND BREXIT 
 
One of the fundamental constitutional changes wrought by Brexit will be the severing of the 
structural link between the UK constitution and the EU’s legal order, and the UK courts and 
the EU courts, founded on the ECA.   As section 1 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 
2018 (WA) makes clear, the ECA will be repealed on ‘exit day’.  It seems then, that the pluralist 
relationship argued for above between EU and UK law will come to a shuddering halt when 
the ECA is formally repealed.  We should therefore expect the future relationship to revert to 
an attenuated dualist one where only the parts of EU law unilaterally and explicitly 
implemented by the UK legislature will have effects within the UK’s legal order.   However, a 
number of features of the WA leave room for doubt as to the explanatory power of dualism in 
explaining the relationship between EU and the UK post-Brexit. 
 Firstly, perhaps the most striking feature of the WA in attempting to sever the close 
relationship between EU law and UK law is that it doesn’t, as one might expect in repealing 
the ECA, repeal all of the EU law in force in the UK prior to exit.  Rather it incorporates, in 
dualist fashion, all EU law in force prior to exit into the UK legal system in an explicit way 
through the maintenance in force of existing EU law prior to exit.53  Moreover, much of the 
EU law retained in the UK’s legal system under the Act will have effects analogous to the 
highest form of domestic law, an Act of the UK parliament.54   The interpretation of retained 
EU law by the EU courts, moreover, is preserved in the WA such that the ‘validity, meaning 
or effect’ of any EU law in force in the UK legal order prior to exit is to be interpreted and 
                                               
53 ss. 2-4 WA. 
54 S. 7. 
15 
applied according to the case law of the EU courts on those laws.55   Thus, in terms of 
preserving the status quo post-exit for the purposes of continuity in the immediate aftermath of 
the UK’s exit from the EU, the WA creates the closest alignment possible between the EU and 
UK legal orders once the UK leaves the organisation.   
Furthermore, a substantive factor in the development of pluralism between courts 
outlined above was the obligation to recognise and apply EU law in the domestic system as 
well as recognise the authority of the Court of Justice of the European Union as the ultimate 
interpreter of EU law.  The changes made to this situation in the WA are significant in that it 
makes clear that UK courts will not be bound by CJEU jurisprudence,56 and cannot make 
preliminary rulings after exit.57   However, as noted above, UK courts will be under an 
obligation to apply ‘retained’ EU law on exit day in a manner superior to pre-exit statutes for 
which the CJEU’s case law will be binding.58  Even more significantly, the link between EU 
courts and UK courts in matters of EU law produced after exit has not been completely severed.  
Section 6(2) WA provides that: 
‘[…] a Court or Tribunal may have regard to anything done on or after exit day by the 
European Court, another EU entity or the EU so far as it is relevant to any matter before 
the court or tribunal.’ 
Thus, as section 6 makes clear, the EU courts will not be completely cut out of the UK 
constitution after exit.  There is still a statutory link between UK domestic courts and the EU 
courts in the WA.  Whereas the link is much weaker than the comparable obligation under the  
ECA, the fact that UK courts have a statutory obligation to have regard to ‘anything done’ by 
                                               
55 s. 6(3) WA. 
56 s. 6(1)(a) 
57 s. 6(1)(b) 
58 S. 6(3) WA. With the important caveat that the Supreme Court will not be bound by any retained case law.  s. 
6(4)(a) but when considering whether to depart from retained EU law, it must apply the same tests it uses when 
departing from its own case law. s. 6(5) 
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the EU courts if of relevance to ‘any matter’ before it retains a significant link between the two 
legal orders.    
Moreover, and perhaps somewhat ironically, the WA in effectuating the UK’s exit from 
the EU has gone where not even the ECA and the subsequent European Union Act 2011 dared 
in, that for the first time explicit statutory recognition is given to ‘the principle of the supremacy 
primacy of EU law’ which will continue to apply ‘on or after exit day’ so far as relevant for 
applying pre-exit law.59  As a judicial doctrine developed by the EU courts, rather than a direct 
provision of treaty law,60 whose reception into the UK’s legal order was the product of judicial 
interpretation and accommodation rather than explicit statutory direction, the precise status and 
nature of the principle referred to in section 5 WA has been a matter of some discussion and 
debate.61 Putting this judicially-developed principle on a statutory footing in UK constitutional 
law raises a whole host of questions regarding its status.  For example, will this statutory 
rendering of the doctrine be ‘more catholic than the pope’ in that it goes above and beyond 
what domestic courts have been willing to ascribe to the principle in domestic law?  Will it be 
a verbatim implementation of the principle as that intended by the EU courts?  If so, how will 
it contend with the more recent nuanced rendering of the principle by the UK courts in recent 
cases such as HS2 and Miller?62  At the very least, we can anticipate a new chapter in the 
accommodation of the doctrine within the UK constitution, building on its incremental 
development in the UK over the past number of decades.  Precisely how distinctive this chapter 
                                               
59 Section 5(1) and (2). 
60 Albeit that it was recognised in a declaration to the Lisbon Treaty.  See above n 14. 
61 See for example S. Douglas-Scott, ‘The Constitutional Implications of the EU(Withdrawal) Act 2018:  A 
Critical Appraisal’, QMUL School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 299/2019; available at:  
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3316710; Craig, P. (2019), Constitutional Principle, the 
Rule of Law and Political Reality: The European Union (Withdrawal) Act (2018) The Modern Law Review, 82: 
319-350; A. Young, ‘Status of EU Law Post Brexit: Part One’, U.K. Const. L. Blog (2nd May 2017); A. Young, 
‘Status of EU Law Post Brexit: Part Two’, U.K. Const. L. Blog (4th May 2017) (available at 
https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/)). 
62 For discussion see A Young, ‘Status of EU Law Post Brexit: Part Two’, UK Constitutional Law Blog (4 May 
2017). 
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will be, and how much it will depart from the previous understanding by the UK courts, remains 
to be seen. 
 
V. CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM IN THE UK AFTER BREXIT 
 
If, as argued above, constitutional pluralism provides a more attractive explanatory framework 
for the accommodation of EU law within the British constitution than its strictly monist or 
dualist counterparts prior to exit, then it is argued that in the light of the key features of the 
WA outlined above, it will continue to have an important explanatory power well after the UK 
exits the EU.   
 Of course, it remains to be seen precisely how these provisions of the WA will be 
interpreted but the framework it sets up is potentially even more constitutionally pluralist than 
the position of current EU membership.  The fact that the EUWA creates a presumption in 
favour of the supremacy of UK law and ultimate authority of the UK courts to resolve such 
conflicts and claims, does not mean that they will automatically be resolved in favour of UK 
law in classically dualist terms, without any recognition of the validity and authority of EU 
law.   
Firstly, we can expect  the ‘living’ EU law developed by EU institutions, including the 
EU courts, to continue to have a role in a post-exit UK constitution.  Where future EU laws or 
EU court judgments amend, revise or develop areas of EU law retained in the EUWA, both 
during the putative ‘transition period’63 as well as afterwards, we can expect it to provide a sort 
of ‘shadow constitution’ to the interpretation and application of EU-related law in the UK 
constitution for the foreseeable future.64 This is a natural result of the retention of valid EU law 
                                               
63 As envisaged by Article 121 of the (unratified) withdrawal agreement.  See European Commission Draft 
Withdrawal Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from 
the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, 28 February 2018.  Available at:  
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/draft-withdrawal-agreement-withdrawal-united-kingdom-great-
britain-and-northern-ireland-european-union-and-european-atomic-energy-community_en 
64 Indeed, if it is the case, as many have argued, that much post-exit regulation developed autonomously by the 
UK will track EU regulation to a considerable degree, then the ‘shadow constitutional’ role that future EU law 
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in the UK system on exit.  Where gaps, abeyances or ambiguities arise in the interpretation of 
this law, its authoritative interpretation by the EU courts cannot but have an effect on how UK 
courts interpret and apply retained EU, even where it seems to conflict with post-Brexit Acts 
of the Westminster Parliament. 
 Moreover, we can expect this ‘shadow constitution’ to have a significant force on the 
UK constitution after exit given the arrangements between the UK and EU courts set up by the 
EUWA.   The types of situations which gave effect to constitutional pluralism – a system or 
source of law claiming authority interacting and conflicting with others claiming authority – is 
maintained to an extent by the EUWA in the structural link set up between the courts under in 
section 6 of the WA.  As noted, this provision provides that UK courts ‘may have regard’ to 
decisions of the EU institutions after exit provided it is ‘relevant to any matter before the court 
or tribunal.’  The scope for taking cognisance of EU decisions – and in particular rulings of the 
EU courts – is particularly broad given that it applies to “any matter’ before a court or tribunal 
and is not explicitly limited to the interpretation of application of retained EU law.65  Moreover, 
the interpretation and meaning of the term “have regard’ is similarly broad and therefore open 
to much  interpretative latitude by the UK courts.  In considering how broadly (and therefore 
pluralistically) the provision could potentially be interpreted, two factors are worth bearing in 
mind; the evolution in the wording of the provision in its passage through Parliament, and the 
way the courts have previously interpreted a similarly broad interpretative mandate in the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA).  The original provision which led to section 7 involved a more 
convoluted formulation using a ‘may have regard’ formula.66  The House of Lords Constitution 
Committee recommended amending the provision using stronger language; namely that courts 
                                               
will play in the UK constitution could be even more pronounced.  See, for example, the UK’s wish to retain the 
EU scheme for data flows after exit.  For discussion, see P. Craig, ‘Miller, EU Law and the UK’ in M Elliot, J 
Williams & A Young (eds) The UK Constitution after Miller and Beyond (Hart, 2018) 
65 s. 6(2). 
66 M Elliot & S Tierney, ‘Political Pragmatism and Constitutional Principle:  The European Union (Withdrawal) 
Act 2018’(2019) Public Law, Jan, 37-60, 44. 
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‘shall have regard’ to future EU court rulings.67  In the event, the provision was amended but 
the ‘may have regard’ formula retained.  However, as Elliot and Tierney argue, not much turns 
on the distinction.68  The interpretation of ‘may’ will be predicated on a relevance test, such 
that a stronger statutory direction to have regard to future EU rulings is the intention and that 
therefore the structural link post-exit between UK courts and the EU courts is stronger than the 
use of the more discretionary term ‘may’ would suggest.   
 Furthermore, in considering the pluralist potential of this provision in terms of the 
future relationship between the courts post-exit, the experience of the HRA can provide some 
indication of just how broad the interpretation given – and the concomitant closer link between 
the courts following a broad interpretation – can be.  As is well known, the HRA creates a duty 
on courts to ‘take into account’ ECHR case law where relevant to the case at hand.69  However, 
the interpretation of this phrase has involved quite a far-reaching emulation of the Strasbourg 
case law in the protection of rights in the UK.70  This approach reached its zenith in what 
became known as the ‘mirror principle’.  According to the mirror principle, UK courts should 
follow the ‘clear and constant jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court’ unless there are ‘special 
circumstances’ not to do so.71 Thus, as its label suggests, the domestic courts should, for all 
intents and purposes, ‘mirror’ the rulings of the EctHR.72  The significance of this from a 
pluralist perspective is that this interpretation sets up a particularly strong structural link 
between the UK courts and the EctHR to set the stage for interactions which are inherently 
pluralist in character.73  For example, the pluralist ‘dialogue’ which evolved out of this link 
                                               
67 ibid. 
68 ibid, Footnote 35. 
69 s. 2 HRA  
70 For discussion of the various formulations and interpretations of the principle, see H. Fenwick, ‘What’s 
Wrong with s. 2 of the Human Rights Act?’ UK Constitutional Law Blog, 2 October, 2012.  Available at:  
https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2012/10/09/helen-fenwick-whats-wrong-with-s-2-of-the-human-rights-act/ 
71 R(Ullah) v. Special Adjudicator [2004] UKHL 26, para. 20 per Lord Bingham. 
72 See Fenwick, above note 70. 
73 For discussion, see C. Mac Amhlaigh, ‘Pluralising Constitutional Pluralism’ in N. Roughan and A. Halpin 
(eds) In Pursuit of Pluralist Jurisprudence (Cambridge University Press, 2017).  Indeed, the experience with the 
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was on display in the UK Supreme Court’s decision in Horncastle.74  In this instance, the 
Supreme Court stated that there were exceptional circumstances for not following the ECtHR’s 
case law, while suggesting that this would be:75 
‘likely to give the Strasbourg Court the opportunity to reconsider the particular aspect 
of the decision that is in issue, so that there takes place what may prove to be a valuable 
dialogue between this court and the Strasbourg court.’ 
This opportunity was taken up by the ECtHR in the subsequent Al-Khawaja case, where it 
responded directly to the Supreme Court’s comments in Horncastle.76   
The point here is that notwithstanding the formal severing by the WA of the structural 
links between the EU and UK courts contained in the ECA which supported a pluralist 
relationship between them, the statutory licence to have ‘have regard’ to future rulings has 
enormous pluralist potential.  Add to this the strong ‘institutional memory’ of the pre-Brexit 
relationship with the Court of Justice among the UK judiciary and we can expect this 
relationship to continue in pluralist terms for some time.  As such, the mechanism securing the 
UK’s departure from the EU, somewhat paradoxically secures much of the status quo during 
membership at least as far as the characterisation of the relationship in pluralist terms is 
concerned.  Indeed, if anything, the post-exit UK constitutional landscape will be even more 
pluralist than prior to exit. 
Finally, to the extent to which constitutional pluralism provides an explanatory account of 
the internal pluralism in one legal system,  77 it can also provide better account of the UK’s 
internal legal order after Brexit than dualism it is argued.  Alongside the provisions setting up 
                                               
HRA shows that a form of constitutional pluralism persists under the UK constitution apart from its experiences 
with EU law. 
74 R v. Horncastle & Others [2009] UKSC 14.   
75 ibid, para. 11. 
76 Al-Khawaja and Tahery v UK 15.12.11 (Applications nos. 26766/05 and 22228/06) 
77 For example, the application of constitutional pluralism internally to the UK’s legal system based on different 
sources of law has been explored by Barber.  See N. Barber, ‘Legal Pluralism and the European Union’ (2006) 
12(3) European Law Journal 306. 
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future EU law as a ‘shadow constitution’ post-Brexit, the WA essentially sets up four distinct 
sources of EU-related valid and enforceable law in the UK constitution: UK law passed prior 
to exit, EU law passed prior to exit, UK law passed after exit and the WA itself.  Thus, the 
relationship between each of these types of law, whereas formally created according to the 
same constitutional authority - an Act of Parliament - will have to be negotiated and their 
precise constitutional status inter se unpacked in terms of some sort of hierarchy of sources, at 
the very least to provide certainty where their provisions conflict.  In this sense, then, 
constitutional pluralism can potentially be internalised into the UK’s own constitutional order 
with four different types of law potentially conflicting and enjoying claims to constitutional 
authority.  Whereas the Act does make some distinctions between types of retained EU law 
creating some hierarchy in the relationship,78 this does not answer the many questions which 
will emerge before the courts on the different types of authority claims attached to each source.  
The later in time rule applying to statutes will probably be more prominent after exit,  however 
conflicts between the different sources of law are unlikely to be fully resolved through the 
application of this rule.79  If the justification for the creation of four distinct categories of law 
is certainty and continuity upon exit,80 it is not clear that the constitutional authority of, for 
example, a post-exit Parliament will necessarily and automatically trump the constitutional 
authority of the previous Parliaments which passed the Withdrawal Act or previous pre-
existing UK legislation which relates to, or attempts to incorporate EU law.  This will especially 
be the case if a purposive interpretation is given to the WA and the goal of maximal legal 
certainty after exit becomes a prominent feature in the application of the Act.  It is also likely 
that the ‘shadow constitution’ of the EU legal order will also have an influence in managing 
                                               
78 Some indication of the order of priority of retained EU law is provided for in the statute.  For example, the 
Act distinguishes between two types of retained EU law – ‘principal’ and ‘minor’.  Moreover, minor retained 
EU law can be more easily amended than principal EU law.  See section 7 WA. 
79 Especially if the WA is deemed to be a constitutional statute and therefore immune from implied repeal. 
80 See White Paper of 30 March 2017, Legislating for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European 
Union (Cm 9446). 
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internal conflicts between the different sources of law identified by the EUWA, each imbued 
with a distinctive constitutional authority.       
  
 
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM WITHIN THE EU POST-BREXIT 
 
A final crucial dimension of constitutional pluralism post-Brexit is the role it will have, and 
continue to have, in an EU of 27 Member States.  Whereas the impact of Brexit will, of course, 
largely be felt within the UK, the withdrawal of a large member state from the bloc does raise 
profound constitutional questions about the future trajectory of integration.  Thus, whatever 
final shape the relationship between the EU and the UK takes after the exit process is complete 
and the future relationship agreed, the process and its aftermath provides an opportunity for 
serious thought about institutional reforms within the bloc itself.  Besides Brexit, the euro-
crisis, the migration crisis, authoritarian regimes sprouting up within its own borders such as 
in Hungary and Poland as well as the Catalan secession crisis have prompted a proliferation of 
proposals for institutional reform.81   
Three features of Brexit as a political event in European integration stand out as 
potentially shaping future reforms which distinguish it from other recent political and economic 
events however;  the timeframe; the remarkable solidarity between the remaining 27 Member 
States in the process of the Brexit negotiations; and the impact on public opinion and 
perceptions of the EU in the remaining EU 27.  These factors, it is argued, present a novel set 
of circumstances as compared with previous crisis which should be factored into any post-
Brexit EU institutional reform agenda and ultimately, it is concluded, support constitutional 
pluralism as a guiding principle of future institutional reforms. 
                                               
81 See Walker, above note 48. 
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One of the key features of Brexit in terms of EU constitutional reform was the ability 
of the EU to manage the process in a controlled timeframe.  The two-year timeframe in Article 
50 TEU, extendable by agreement, allowed for an important ‘breathing space’ to form a 
common position on Brexit internally to effectively manage the exit process as well as to reflect 
upon institutional reform in a measured way.    This can be contrasted with the ‘pressure-cooker’ 
atmosphere of recent reforms in migration and the euro.82  In the case of these latter events, the 
timing and management of the process were dictated as much by external events and actors – 
bond markets and large external population flows – as they were about internally set deadlines 
making good reform more difficult.83   
 Another feature of Brexit is the much-vaunted solidarity between the remaining EU 27.   
Predictions of dis-union due to special-interest lobbying within specific Member States and a 
stampede for the exit door among other Member States post-Brexit have not materialised.  
Rather the remaining 27 have shown a particularly marked level of solidarity – even on thorny 
issues such as the Irish border -  in the withdrawal negotiations.  This solidarity and discipline 
has enhanced the agency and efficiency of the EU as a political actor.84   
Another significant feature of the post-referendum EU political landscape is the 
perceptible change in public opinion about the EU across the remaining 27 member states.  The 
EU, has enjoyed, paradoxically, a remarkable bump in its popularity since the vote among the 
remaining 27 member states.85    This shift in public opinion has also, it seems, impacted upon 
                                               
82 See C Mac Amhlaigh, ’10 (pro-EU) reasons to be cheerful after Brexit’, Verfassungsblog 22 July 2016 
available at:  https://verfassungsblog.de/10-pro-eu-reasons-to-be-cheerful-after-brexit/ 
83 Of course, this doesn’t mean that Brexit doesn’t have the potential to become a chaotic crisis for the EU to 
manage.  The domestic disarray in the UK as to what, precisely, Brexit should mean as well as the deep political 
cleavages as to what the future relationship with the EU should look like have led to two extensions to the 
Brexit deadline at the time of writing.  However, this political ‘extend and pretend’ could end up scuppering the 
EU’s unity on Brexit on display hitherto.  See ‘Macron gets on everyone’s nerves with Brexit hard man act’ 
Bloomberg, 11 April 2019:  https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-11/macron-gets-on-everyone-s-
nerves-with-brexit-hard-man-act 
84 Again, something that cannot be taken for granted, not least given the possibilities of the UK’s domestic 
political crisis spilling over into the EU.   
85 ‘Brexit causes resurgence in pro-EU leanings across continent’, The Guardian, 8 July 2016:  
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/08/brexit-causes-resurgence-in-pro-eu-leanings-across-continent 
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populist movements in the remaining 27 who might have pushed for a similar Brexit-style 
disruption to the integration project.  Since Brexit, populist anti-EU movements in other 
Member States have subtlety changed their rhetoric.  Whereas the anti-EU rhetoric is still there, 
the focus has shifted from demands for exit from the bloc86 to demands for internal EU reform 
to satisfy their populist agendas.87  For example,  Le Pen’s proposals for a ‘Union of European 
Nations’,88 Salvini’s bid to ‘save Europe’,89  Varoufakis’ launch of a pan-European movement 
for reform for the 2019 European elections,90 or Orban’s claims to be fighting for the 
restoration of a ‘Christian Europe’91 are all noteworthy in virtue of the fact that they do not 
contain an explicit push for exit from the bloc.  Even if these developments are still in their 
infancy, they do show that populism and euro-scepticism are not necessarily genetically linked 
and that an internal EU populism is possible.  It is also evidence, at least for now, that the loss 
of a member (and a large and strategically significant member at that) is not ultimately fatal to 
the integration project.  Moreover, these developments also provide some, however tentative, 
evidence of some sort of  pan-European politics taking hold in national politics in the remaining 
Member States.92  Of course the depth and extent of post-Brexit support for the EU cannot be 
exaggerated nor the effective management and solidarity evident in the Brexit process taken 
for granted. Nonetheless, it is submitted that these features of the post-Brexit political 
                                               
86 See for example, ‘Populists Sweden Democratic ditch ‘Swexit’ ahead of EU elections, Reuters 6 February 
2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-sweden-politics-eu/populist-sweden-democrats-ditch-swexit-ahead-of-
eu-elections-idUKKCN1PV28Q 
87 A. Clarkson, ‘Thought populists want to kill the EU?  It’s worse than that’, Politico 8 January 2019: 
https://www.politico.eu/article/populist-attitude-to-eu-matteo-salvini-far-right/ 
88 ‘Marine Le Pen re-emerges whistling the same old tune’, Irish Times, 16 January 2018, 
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/marine-le-pen-re-emerges-whistling-the-same-old-tune-
1.3356619 
89 ‘Matteo Salvini: I believe in Europe’, Politico, 12 March 2018:   
https://www.politico.eu/article/matteo-salvini-i-believe-in-europe/ 
90 https://diem25.org/ 
91 ‘Viktor Orbán: our duty is to protect Hungary's Christian culture’ 7 May 2018:  
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/07/viktor-orban-hungary-preserve-christian-culture 
92 Which is, again tentatively, supported by the reversal of the decline in turnout for European parliamentary 
elections.  The European Parliamentary elections which took place on the weekend of May 24-26, 2019 saw the 
highest turnout in 20 years and constituted the first time that a decline in turnout had been reversed.  See 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/eu-affairs/20190523STO52402/elections-2019-highest-
turnout-in-20-years 
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landscape are more conducive to favourable reform, particularly reform which is more 
democratically engaged with enhanced popular buy-in than previous reforms.  The question 
then remains whether and what role the normative ideals of constitutional pluralism can play 
in a post-Brexit reform agenda.    
One implication of the post-Brexit EU political and popular landscape might be that it 
clears the way for further and deeper integration in a more federal direction thereby spelling 
the end of constitutional pluralism as a normative principle relevant to the EU.  If Brexit has 
resulted in the greater acceptance of the project among its remaining citizens, and the 
inevitability of the project among its harsher euro-sceptic critics, then it would seem that further 
developments in a more federal direction would be the natural trajectory of constitutional 
reform in the immediate term.  Add to this the fact that one of its more awkward members is 
departing, and a more robust federalisation of the EU seems almost inevitable.  This is certainly 
the interpretation of the lessons of Brexit among some of the EU’s more vocal characters.93  In 
this scenario, constitutional pluralism could be dispensed with, a regrettable necessity in the 
journey to further integration which has now outlived its purpose.94 
However, it is not clear that we should dismiss the role of constitutional pluralism in 
future reform so swiftly.  If it is the case that we can expect more favourable political winds in 
respect of the acceptance and popularity of the integration project for the foreseeable future 
among the remaining 27 Member State which is accompanied by increased popular interest 
and engagement with the EU, arguably constitutional pluralism is a more appropriate approach 
to further reform than an elite-driven federal blueprint. 
Firstly, it is not clear that the bump in support for the EU  such as it is can be translated 
into an unambiguous desire for a federal European future.  Admittedly, writing before the 
                                               
93 See above note 13. 
94 See Kelemen and Pech in the current volume. 
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Brexit vote, Walker has argued, that there is still a lack of real social and political demand for 
a federal Europe,95 and it is not clear that much has changed in this regard in the Brexit 
aftermath. Furthermore, if support for the integration project is sustained and experiments 
cultivating further citizen engagement such as a the Spitzenkandidaten procedure do mature 
into more robust democratic engagement with the EU level,96 including up to the level of 
popular constitutional reform, none of this means that a federal Europe is the inevitable and 
inexorable finalite politique of a post-Brexit EU.97  Capitalising on increased popular 
engagement with, and understanding of,  the EU post-Brexit does not, necessarily, require a 
full constitutionalisation and federalisation of the project; in short an EU sovereignty.  A more 
informed and engaged citizenry may balk at what has already been achieved at the EU level 
and demand some repatriation of power form the centre to the Member States.  As with any 
multi-level governance system, especially one as contested as the EU, we can expect an 
emergent pan-European politics to involve good-faith disagreements about how to resolve 
tensions between political identity and appropriate levels of governance for the achievement of 
common goods alongside conventional disagreements on substantive matters of policy.98   
 In this regard, then, perhaps the ‘placeholder’ of constitutional pluralism can, as Walker 
suggests it should, mature into a more permanent guiding principle of EU constitutional reform.  
Walker ultimately calls for a ‘reconstitutionalisation’ of the EU in a resolutely pluralist 
direction - ‘a new kind of constitutional dualism’99 – where constitutional pluralism provides 
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the guiding ethos of constitutional reform at the EU level such as to stabilise and enhance its 
autonomy, yet at the same time does not challenge its Member States as original political 
communities.    Only once  this form of genuine constitutional dualism takes hold in EU 
constitutional processes, he concludes, can we  ‘envisage how the overlap of heterarchically 
related constitutional authorities of the common part and the local parts, rather than 
undermining or eroding the legitimacy of each such authority, becomes a condition of 
legitimacy of the combined whole.’100  The flexibility of the idea and its studied rejection of a 
resolution of the question of hierarchy and ultimate authority may therefore be a more apt 
framework principle for a fragile emerging pan-European politics, and indeed may itself 
become endorsed by such politics, than the federalism that many proponents of pan-European 
politics assume.101      
  
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
Brexit poses considerable challenges at many levels, both UK and EU.  However, as argued 
here, constitutional pluralism as a ‘post’ or ‘late’ sovereign model of legal interaction and 
supranational governance will continue to have particular analytical and normative purchase in 
the aftermath of the UK’s exit from the bloc.     One of the justifications of Brexit was the 
desire to ‘take back control’ and project British sovereignty at a global level.  However, the 
method through which this is to be done somewhat ironically,  is a ‘post’ or ‘late’ sovereign 
one as manifested in the constitutional pluralist features of the post-Brexit constitutional 
framework at UK and EU levels.  This seriously questions whether sovereignty of the classic 
or Westphalian kind retains its analytical and aspirational purchase in an increasingly 
interdependent globe.  This is primarily because the fundamental reasons which underpin 
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Authorities:  Conflicts, Cooperation and Transnational Legal Theory (Oxford University Press, 2013) 
101 J Habermas, ‘Democracy in Europe: Why the Development of the EU Into a Transnational Democracy Is 
Necessary and How It Is Possible’ (2015) 21 European Law Journal 546 
28 
constitutional pluralist structures in the first place – increasing global interdependence 
combined with resilient national political communities and the mismatch between citizen 
expectation and the capacity of states to manage problems alone – will not disappear after 
Brexit.  Brexit won’t ‘uninvent’ the internet, put a stop to cheap ‘jet-age’ travel, quell the desire 
of peoples to migrate to escape violence or simply seek a better life, or halt the warming of the 
climate.  However, nor will it quell the need for a sense of communal and political identity to 
which support for Brexit is partly attributable.  The political and constitutional challenges of 
the contemporary world, therefore, involve  increasing interdependence and the necessity of 
communal identity; the solving of common problems such as global warming while at the same 
time fulfilling the human need for communal belonging.  Constitutional pluralism is uniquely 
suited to support the institutional arrangements to optimise these ends in the form of interacting 
legal orders as well as providing normative guidance for institutional reforms well into the 
future. 
